Panama's departure from China's BRI marks a historic shift in the Latin American geopolitical status quo. As the U.S. seeks to counteract this influence and strengthen maritime security, it must prioritize disentangling nations, such as Argentina and Peru, from PRC control to safeguard stability in the Western hemisphere.
Panama’s decision to not renew its participation in China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) marks a historic shift of the status quo in Latin America. As a bedrock of the Chinese Communist Party’s regional influence, the BRI has posed a direct challenge to the neutrality guaranteed by the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977. Now, the U.S. is making a concerted effort at removing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from its backyard, but this is just one piece of a larger geopolitical puzzle that binds China into Latin America’s most critical sectors for trade and economic prosperity.
Over the last decade, the PRC’s BRI has aggressively demonstrated its ulterior motives in Latin America as it has constructed a widespread geopolitical web. What began in 2013 as an infrastructure strategy connecting Asia, Europe, and Africa, has since metastasized into a $286 billion investment into Latin America, with 22 member states. China’s investment in “critical infrastructure, including deep-water ports, cyber, and space facilities.” in tandem with soft power tactics and “comprehensive strategic partnerships” pose massive national security risks to the U.S. Maritime infrastructure, built by Chinese state-owned enterprises, has the power to serve a “dual purpose”: enabling trade while facilitating military activity, surveillance, and control over critical supply chains. During a potential military escalation, civilian infrastructures can easily support the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Other PRC-sponsored ports around the world already serve the PLA warships “for refueling, maintenance, or shore leave”. The Panama Canal demonstrates the urgency of limiting Chinese influence at strategic choke points that could be used to disrupt trade, resource supply, and U.S. military responsiveness during exigencies.
This deal is the first step towards responsible governance against the PRC in the region, but there is still much to be done. While Secretary Rubio is also visiting El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, to discuss the issues of transnational crime, migration, and strengthening North-South cooperation, the PRC and People’s Liberation Army Navy still maintain significant control over the region across every key sector, most importantly, maritime infrastructure.
The Panama Canal is not the only strategic maritime point of access that China exerts influence over. In 2024, China invested over $1.3 billion to construct the Chancay deepwater port in Peru - a key piece of the PRC’s larger maritime “Silk Road”. The Chinese state-owned enterprise COSCO owns over 60% of the port. Considered the “gateway from South America to Asia”, this project is actively orienting trade from Latin America to China.
Even more controversial, the PRC’s proposed $500 million port in the Rio Grande, Argentina, in Tierra del Fuego. This is a massive security concern for the U.S., as the PLA's control over this port would give China complete access to the Straits of Magellan and the Drake passage- critical sea routes in the Antarctic.
While China’s maritime prowess in Latin America is a grave concern, its dabbling in the Arctic introduces another layer to its broader geopolitical strategy in the Western hemisphere. China has demonstrated an interest in the Arctic, collaborating with Russia to assert itself as an Arctic power. While the U.S. aims to preserve the region as “a place that is both stable and secure”, China’s motives are clear. Since 2018, it has deployed multiple naval vessels to the Arctic and has articulated its vision for the region as a crucial piece to its “Polar Silk Road”. Further complicating the matter, the PLA has masked its military ambitions for the Arctic under the guise of scientific exploration and climate change urgency to expand its footprint and double down on its cooperation with Moscow. The Arctic appears to slowly be advancing away from a stable zone to a now highly militarized zone.
Taken together, the concern is that the U.S. is already “sandwiched” by China. China’s Belt and Road Initiative in tandem with its Arctic strategy allows the PRC to initiate a geopolitical “pincer movement”, arming China with the ability to close in on the U.S. from both poles. In the event of a potential conflict, the U.S. would lose access to geographical sea routes vital for military response and trade in both the North and the South.
While the outcome of Secretary Rubio’s visit to Panama is a commendable step and is the most proactive the U.S. has been in addressing direct threats to the homeland, America’s return to Latin America must prioritize de-incentivizing cooperation with the PRC in strategically important countries, such as Argentina and Peru. He must work to disentangle the region from the PRC-centric status quo, not as a matter of exerting control in the region, but as a matter of safeguarding U.S. national security. This requires a multilateral maritime security agreement to secure the Western hemisphere’s strategic maritime infrastructures and facilitate a collective security framework in supply chain security. Failure to do so continues to allow the PRC to design the Western hemisphere as its own playground for its military ambitions, leaving the U.S. to face the consequences of its own inaction.
